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A new configuration of social science is emerging in these digital times, as we tap into 
new kinds of data that trouble conventions regarding what constitutes the unit of analysis, 
and question the extent to which this data is owned or even correlated to a definitive 
organic and individuated subject customarily referred to as ‘human’. These 
methodological shifts demand a more careful consideration of the historical lineage of 
empiricism and its relation to the history of science more generally. In this paper, I track 
the historical mutations of monadology, an ontology well suited to empiricism in these 
digital times. Both Gilles Deleuze and Bruno Latour ascribe to variants of monadology in 
their proposals for a new empiricism, drawing extensively on the work of Gabriel Tarde 
(1843-1904), a French sociologist, judge, and author of the audacious post-humanist 1895 
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text Sociology and monadology. In this paper I discuss how monadology helps us rethink 
research methods in these digital times. I argue that a fractal monadology re-assembles 
the fold with the digital, the continuous with the discrete, and ultimately offers a 





New developments in digital technologies, software analytics and computational 
power are changing the relationship between the quantitative and the qualitative in social 
science methods. These developments have occurred alongside a growing interest in 
philosophies of immanence, and a widespread turn to the study of non-human agency 
(Bennett, 2010; Braidotti, 2013; Coole & Frost, 2010). This confluence of ideas and 
practices is changing the way we think about the relationship between mind and matter, 
with implications for empiricism in the social sciences (Sorensen, 2011). A new 
configuration of social science is emerging in these digital times, as we tap into new 
kinds of data that trouble conventions regarding what constitutes the unit of analysis, and 
question the extent to which this data is owned or even correlated to a definitive organic 
and individuated subject customarily referred to as ‘human’. These methodological shifts 
demand a more careful consideration of the historical lineage of empiricism and its 
relation to the history of science more generally. Such historical work can help identify 
and articulate the specific contributions of new empiricisms. 
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In this paper, I track the historical mutations of monadology, a philosophical 
approach to empiricism well suited to these digital times. The term monadology refers to 
a metaphysical theory formally developed by the 18th century philosopher Gottfried 
Leibniz who rejected Cartesian dualist ontology. Leibniz argued that mind and matter 
were composed of the same simple substance, that being the monad. Although ‘simple’, 
each monad expressed the universe and was as such composed of infinite folds. Leibniz 
is likely to have taken the term ‘monad’ from the tradition of Pythagorean philosophy, 
and perhaps also from other scholars who had used it in related but different ways 
(Strickland, 2014). Although not new, Leibniz’ monadology text, published in 1714 and 
comprised of less than 6,000 words, has inspired a vast array of diverse proposals for 
how mind and matter commingle. 
Both Gilles Deleuze and Bruno Latour ascribe to variants of monadology in their 
proposals for a new empiricism. In the case of Deleuze (1988a,b, 1993), monadology is 
essential for his theory of difference and multiplicity, and for how he studies the virtual 
dimensions of matter. In the case of Latour (2010, 2012), monadology becomes a way of 
rethinking how degrees of agency are distributed across human and non-human agents. 
Both Deleuze and Latour will draw extensively on the work of Gabriel Tarde (1843-
1904), a French sociologist, judge, and author of the audacious post-humanist 1895 text 
Sociology and monadology. Unlike Leibniz, Tarde proposed an atheistic monadology, in 
which monads aggregate because of desire and avidity, rather than teleology or destiny. 
Tarde uses the monadology as a way to rethink social science methods, avoiding the 
binary between agent and structure, and developing an alternative way of thinking about 
quantitative methods in the social sciences.  
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In this paper I discuss how monadology helps us rethink research methods in 
these digital times. Drawing primarily from Deleuze and Latour, I argue that a fractal 
monadology re-assembles the fold with the digital, the continuous with the discrete, and 
ultimately offers a philosophical foundation for contemporary social science research. In 
so doing, I follow other work in related fields that seeks to develop an adequate notion of 
the recombinant subject that is not identified with a numerical statistical data point, but 
with a fractal complexity in itself (Galloway, 2014; Massumi, 1992; Portanova, 2009).  
 
2. The fold 
Initially, one might think that the continuous fold is simply at odds with the digital, since 
the two seem to reference two fundamentally distinct modes of being. But in a world 
where the flows of desire and affiliation are increasingly digitized and quantified at scales 
beyond human perception, where we gleefully participate in calculated publics and 
software cultures, and where neuroscience shows that we often perform calculations 
unconsciously, it seems rather urgent that we reconsider the nature of the fold.   
We are discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments, but we 
all remain Leibnizan because what always matters is folding, unfolding, 
refolding (Deleuze, 1993, p. 137). 
Deleuze (1993) characterizes monadology as a way of theorizing multiplicity and 
difference as fundamental ontological forces. Monadology offers an alternative way of 
thinking about individuation and distinctness, recasting the relationship between the one 
and the many. Distinctness is no longer that which separates and cuts off one individual 
or object from another, but refers rather to a particular fold or twist in the undulating 
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fabric of the universe. Processes of individuation, by which identities and subjects and 
institutions come into being, are not acts of disconnection or separation, whereby the one 
is cut off from the rest, but are continuous topological folds of the whole. Thus a 
monadology works through topological concepts of connectivity and elasticity, in which 
individuals emerge through continuous stretching and distortion. This process describes 
all being, whether it be the birth of an idea or concept, or the making of a bowl. If we 
were able to see monads, we would see how bowls and concepts were simply folds of the 
one simple substance. This is a haptic theory of contiguous relationality, a way of 
studying life as it contracts and expands across a continuum of mind-matter. The smallest 
unit of matter or life, thus, is not the atom or any other particle, but is rather the fold. 
Leibniz offers a truly relational ontology: 
The division of the continuous must not be taken as of sand dividing into grains, 
but as that of a sheet of paper or of a tunic in folds, in such a way that an infinite 
number of folds can be produced, some smaller than others, but without the 
body ever dissolving into points or minima. (Leibniz, Pacidus Philalethi (C, 614-
15), in Deleuze, 1993, p. 6) 
 
Thus Leibniz’s monads are riddled with folds that produce caverns within caverns, ‘each’ 
compressed differently by the forces of appetite and perception. For Leibniz, each monad 
expressed the entirety of the universe, a distinct perspective or contraction of the 
relational forces that saturate the monadology. A fold is never final, never a definitive 
cut, and thus the mechanism of creation is invagination, pleating, further folding and 
twisting, rather than unfolding or cutting. For Leibniz, this “muscular conception of 
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matter” corresponds to a spirit in matter, a vitalism or virtuality inherent to matter itself 
(Deleuze, 1993, p. 7).  
 
This focus on the fold is related to Leibniz’ development of the concept of the 
infinitesimal as the “smallest interval”, an interval that is smaller than any conceivable 
measurement, but still, and yet paradoxically, not zero. Deleuze (1994) will use this 
concept to argue for the idea of difference in itself and claim that we must study degrees 
of difference rather than differences in degree. In other words, the fold, as the basic 
ontological ‘unit’, captures this idea of difference in itself because it can always be 
further folded. Two distinct individuals partake in this difference in differing degrees 
(some more folded than others), but there is no absolute measure that will allow us to 
distinguish them, since the one always folds the other. Thus the emphasis on the 
monadological fold rebukes a difference (or distinctness/individuation) that is determined 
through reference to something outside of it. With this emphasis, we begin to glimpse the 
consequences for empiricism, since the monadology demands that we shift from 
‘interaction’ between distinct individuals, to intra-action, much like the proposal of Karen 
Barad to rethink relational ontology using ideas from quantum physics (2007).  
 
Between the years 1886-1904, Gabriele Tarde develops these ideas within the field of 
sociology, arguing that there is never a complete cut-out of the individual, only folds and 
knotted twists in the one flowing substance of society. For Tarde, everything is a society, 
including cells, viruses, ants, rocks and schools. Each society is a particular configuration 
of the one simple substance – the monad – whether it be human or non-human. The key 
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for Tarde is that difference and variation underlie all illusions of oneness and unity, so 
that difference in itself – rather than difference between distinct individuals – is inherent 
to all matter and life. Rather than Leibniz’ appetite and perception, Tarde’s monadology 
folds according to the two fundamental actions of imitation and invention (much like 
Deleuze’s repetition and difference). Invention for Tarde is not the neo-liberal celebration 
of the entrepreneur. Tarde’s invention occurs by way of an individual only insofar as the 
multiplicity of imitations and repetitions associated with that individual lead a “life of 
their own” (Latour and Lépinay, 2009, pp.37-38). In other words, invention is a collective 
swarm of imitative actions occurring at the level of the trait (Tarde, 1903/2009). This 
swarm of imitation reconfigures the relations that comprise the individual. A society is 
monadological in that there are no individuals. Focus on the fold rather than the 
individual allows Tarde to decenter human agency. Thus freedom is expressed in 
relationships to varying degrees, but not as an attribute of individuals. Creativity and 
invention are simply “a particular moment between invention and adaptation”(Latour and 
Lépinay, 2009, p.43). Social Darwinism is avoided, in theory, as long as one stays close 
to the monads and resists the appeal to master plans, teleological designs, and 
overarching structures. 
 
Because of the nature of a continuous fold, agents in a monadology don’t ‘interact’ with 
each other, “they own one another to begin with” (Latour, 2012, p.7). Tarde argues that a 
monadology operates through the verb “to have” rather than “to be”. The French verb 
avoir is used to conjugate most verbs, including verbs associated with subjective feelings, 
like to be hungry (J’ai faime). Tarde’s focus on the material verb to have rather than the 
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existential verb to be is a direct statement of his anti-Cartesianism. In this case, to own 
one another to begin with suggests various material ways of belonging to each other, but 
not in terms of set containment (not, for instance, as an element within the enclosure of a 
set), which tends to entrench inside/outside ways of conceptualizing the verb to have. For 
Tarde, there is a relational ethics at stake in the monadology that insists we imagine 
monads in terms of how they express the world. Every monad contains all the other 
monads insofar as the world is comprised of an infinite continuum of ongoing expression. 
In other words, a monadology is a vast undulating flow of affective expressivity, 
contracting and expanding into the infinite past and future. His emphasis on the material 
verb to have allows us to better grasp the temporality of becoming (rather than being), 
and the contiguity of the past with the future.  
 
All philosophy hitherto has been based on the verb Be [être], the definition of 
which was the philosopher’s stone, which all sought to discover. We may affirm 
that, if it had been based on the verb to Have [avoir], many sterile debates and 
fruitless intellectual exertions would have been avoided. From this principle, I am, 
all the subtlety in the world has not made it possible to deduce any existence other 
than my own: hence the negation of external reality. If however, the postulate I 
have [J’ai] is posited, as the fundamental fact, both that which has [eu] and that 
which is had [ayant] are given inseparably at once (Tarde, 1895/2012, p. 52, 
original emphasis).  
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The verb “avoir” captures the immanence of life, because it stresses the material coupling 
and contiguous haptic encountering of everyday life. In moving away from the Cartesian 
verb “to be”, which seems to be stuck in the dichotomy of being and non-being, 
monadology operates in and through the materiality of life. Predicates that typically are 
assigned to being (i.e. I am female) become degrees of having (I have some degree of 
female). Note how this ‘having’ is not possession of an element in a set, because it is a 
matter of the degree to which monads express each other. My body expresses female to 
some degree, and female expresses my body to some degree, and these degrees are not 
equal. Clearly degrees of power are at work here in configuring the topological features 
of the monadology.  
 
To have or to possess is to fold, in other words, to convey what one contains 
“with a certain power.” If the Baroque has often been associated with capitalism, 
it is because the Baroque is linked to a crisis of property, a crisis that appears at 
once with the growth of new machines in the social field and the discovery of 
new living beings in the organism. (Deleuze, 1993, p. 110) 
 
Deleuze directs our attention to how the particular monadology of Leibniz was 
linked to the particular historical time in which it was articulated. Indeed, as I discuss 
below, the link between capitalism and monadology becomes newly inflected in our 
digital times. But before turning to this issue, I raise the question here as to how 
knowledge is conceived in a folding monadology. What could it mean for one monad to 
know another, if each is always already an expression of all the others? And how might 
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the monadology furnish a new answer to this question, different from the usual 
postmodern claim that we are always already implicated in our representations of others? 
First, the monadology studies relationships less in terms of representation, and more in 
terms of haptic contiguity – or contagion. Second, the monadology offers more than the 
relativism of postmodernism, which focused on the epistemic limitations of an 
individual’s knowledge of the world. Instead, the monadology affirms an ontological 
relativism, rather than an epistemological relativism. It asserts that diversity and 
difference are not simply evidence of human limitation, but are rather essential forces in 
the world. This is precisely what Deleuze has in mind when he speaks of difference in 
itself. We can see where Deleuze found his inspiration: 
 
To exist is to differ; difference is, in a sense, the truly substantial side of things; 
it is at once their ownmost possession and that which they hold most in 
common. This must be our starting point, and we must refrain from further 
explaining this principle, since all things come back to it – including identity, 
which is more usually, but mistakenly, taken as the point of departure. For 
identity is only the minimal degree of difference and hence a kind of difference, 
and an infinitely rare kind, as rest is only a special case of movement, and the 
circle only a particular variety of ellipse. (Tarde, 1895/2012, p. 40). 
 
We might still ask what comes of epistemology if knowledge is no longer or not only 
the more or less accurate representation of the world (Maclure, 2013). As part of this 
ontological turn, Tarde will claim that an increase in knowledge ‘about’ the world entails 
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tracking the material fold that was previously taken to be a cut. Learning is a process of 
feeling the contiguous links that are woven together to form the fabric of the 
monadology. Thus knowledge is based on haptic encountering (touch) rather than 
representation and image. To know is to track the contiguity between, to flow through the 
connecting lines, and feel the collective affect as it contracts into a knot, or expands and 
undulates across the surface of a swarm. To know is to become this material configuration 
of proliferating folds and crenellations. I will argue in the proceeding sections of this 
paper that this monadological approach to epistemology is different from previous 
postmodernisms insofar as it engages with new digital media. These media are in fact 
fully material, and are folded into the ever-changing monadology.  
 
3. The recombinant subject 
Deleuze (1988b) will introduce the term “superfold” to describe the ways in which 
contemporary digital life is monadological (p.131). In describing the digital variant of 
monadology that emerges in our post-cybernetic world, he brings together the iterative 
algorithm of computing power with the genetic fold of life, and points to the 
micropolitics of traits and non-human forces:  
Biology had to take a leap into molecular biology, or dispersed life regroup in 
the genetic code. Dispersed work had to regroup in third-generation machines, 
cybernetics and information technology. What would be the forces in play, with 
which the forces within man would then enter into a relation? It would no longer 
involve raising to infinity or finitude but an unlimited finity, thereby evoking 
every situation of force in which a finite number of components yields a 
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practically unlimited diversity of combinations. It would be neither the fold or 
the unfold that would constitute the active mechanism, but something like the 
Superfold, as borne out by the foldings proper to the chains of the genetic code, 
and the potential of silicon in third-generation machines … The forces within 
man enter into a relation with forces from the outside, those of silicon which 
supersedes carbon, or genetic components which supersede the organism …. In 
each case we must study the operations of the superfold, of which the “double 
helix” is the best-known example. (Deleuze, 1988b, p131-132, note that surpli 
could be translated as overfold) 
Just as the fold was used by Deleuze to describe the Baroque subject, the superfold 
or overfold is used to describe the current “computerized control society” (Galloway, 
2014, p. 108). The dividual (rather than the individual) and the superfold are the key 
tropes of this new era, still monadological, but reconfiguring the relation between the 
discrete and the continuous. The term dividual refers to the traits that flow through 
the monadology, across what appears to be an individual member of a society, 
forging a swarming transindividual society. For Deleuze, the subject emerges 
through the multiple permutations of these traits – “an unlimited diversity of 
combinations”. If the fold conveys a smoothness, the superfold introduces an 
algorithmic iteration, a transversal crease in the fabric. The superfold is thus the 
crease or line that produces a repetition within the monadology. If the fold is “the 
unit of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth” (Deleuze, 1993, p.6) then the 
superfold is the combinatorial repetition of that fold, the twist or crease of the fold, 
evoked in the example offered by Deleuze of the double helix. While the Baroque 
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subject was pleated into matter, contemporary dividuals are recombinant subjects, 
assembling always in relation to the bioinformatic ecosystem. This recombinant 
subject is dispersed across “an unlimited finity” of molecular repetitions. The 
superfold will be a fractal fold, an iterative craggy fold, a transversal crease where 
the flow splits apart. The superfold points to a new way of incorporating the discrete 
into the continuous, and suggests that the act of calculating occurs at the most minute 
scales.   
This fractal monadology seems to offer a philosophical foundation for developing new 
research methods suitable to these digital times. Galloway (2014) will link this to the 
current digital dispersion of observation and document, where a multiplicity of points of 
view proliferate and flood the world, where pixels are re-assembled at micro scales, and 
millions of data points are mined every nano-second. The fractal iteration repeats the fold 
– where one might think of the fold as the analog event – and generates a self-similar 
somewhat dilated and distorted superfold. It is this iterative repetition of the fold that 
introduces the discrete into the world. And it is through the discrete that the world begins 
to count and calibrate. Calculation and numeracy are thus not unique human capacities. 
Instead, calculation is a tendency or potentiality of all matter, be it human or non-human. 
According to this philosophy, geometry would become a more material mingling of geo 
and metric, rather than an idealization or abstraction. For Kirby (2011), too much of 
socio-cultural discourse theory forecloses this possibility by defining geometry against 
geology, language against matter, where the former always codes the latter. Instead she 
urges us to consider a nonhuman mathesis that disallows any exemption from measure. 
Of course there are huge dangers in pursuing this theoretical path. It’s all too easy to 
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imagine dystopic scenarios where we pay tribute to a calculating universe with built-in 
agenda. We know all too well the horrors of quantitative methods enthral to cybernetic 
dreams of calculated publics and digital labor. 
But Deleuze helps us see how the control society is not simply imposed on us from 
without - we come to realize that computation is within us.  We are computational 
everywhere, from RNA recombination to markets to digesting stomachs to degrees of 
affect. Through this fractal monadology, we begin to grasp the flow and the quanta as 
mutually entailed. When we consider the digital proliferation of life in our digitized 
collectives, we can see how a philosophy of immanence is addressed through a fractal 
monadology. Rather than banish the digital as the other to the continuous, or confine their 
relationship to a dialectic resolution, Deleuze tracks the calculating micro-habits 
generative of continuous matter. Thus we are asked to imagine how the quantitative 
functions in research methods aside from the usual segmenting of the continuous, where 
quantity is always assumed to be that which is outside of matter. Our research methods 
must begin to imagine how discrete quantity is somehow immanent within continuous 
matter. Might it be the case that computation, calculation, and the digital more generally, 
are the most adequate ways of communing with matter?  
 
How might such a claim be taken up and developed into a research method? How might 
there be a notion of quantity associated with this continuous flow? Indeed, Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) will argue for “the importance of statistics, providing it concerns itself 
with the cutting edges and not only with the ‘stationary’ zone of representations.” (p. 
219). Such a statistics must pursue the lines of flight, the zig-zag folds that form creases 
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in the monadology and segment the fabric in new transversal directions. But such a 
statistics must keep close the fact that these creases “exist only by virtue of the flow 
suffusing them” (p. 218). In other words, we need to attend to the quantum flows that 
suffuse and modulate the macropolitics of institutional practices (de Freitas, 2014). For 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), this is precisely why Tarde was interested in the world of 
detail and the infinitesimal, the miniscule variation of a bureaucratic detail, the minute 
movements that constituted a sub-representative matter (p. 219). Tarde critiqued 
Durkheim’s sociology of ‘social norms’ for how it failed to address exactly what needed 
explaining, that being “the similarity of millions of people” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
218). Durkheimains claimed that Tarde was more of a psychologist than a sociologist 
because of this attention to trait and habit. But he was less interested in how one 
individual copied another, and instead committed to a theory of flow or wave propagation 
through a swarm or collective, tracking the way that these flows were superimposed and 
diffracted. Flows, for Tarde, were always comprised of belief and desire, and were 
quantifiable not as discrete units but as infinitesimal propagation. Attention to flows 
offers us a way around the individual-structure binary that haunts the Durkheim 
sociology project, because flows are indifferent to these two constructs. You cannot 
attribute a flow to an individual or to a structure.  In the next section, I discuss how Bruno 
Latour develops this idea, drawing again from Tarde’s monadology.  
 
4. Calculating matter 
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Latour (2002, 2010, 2012) lauds Tarde for his radically different vision of what it 
might mean for a discipline to be quantitative. Latour reads Tarde as offering an 
alternative to the tradition of parametric statistical modeling that has all too often 
misrecognized the dynamic nature of society. Indeed, the very public dispute between 
Tarde and Durkheim regarding what role statistics plays in sociology supports this 
reading. Tarde considered the social science of his time reflected a particular “patchy 
statistical apparatus” and that social scientists should think past the methods of statistics 
to new ways of working with the quantitative (Latour, 2010, p. 152). In Latour’s words, 
the way we work with and conceive the quantitative has huge impact on social theory - 
“you have the social theory of your statistics” (Latour, 2010, p. 152).  
Recall that for Tarde, the sociologist, everything is a society, including human and 
non-human collectives. Whether a collective of humans, rats, rocks, or shoes, each 
collective operates as a society. But studies of society have different methods depending 
on their material access to what they study. Thus there should be important differences 
between methods, not because of any fundamental ontological difference between human 
and non-human, but because we humans have different kinds of access to different kinds 
of society. For Tarde, different methods are demanded because of the scale and relative 
size of that which is under study. Whenever we study something that operates at a 
radically different scale to human interaction, we are obliged to use different methods. 
It’s important to note that such a distinction changes with time, as we develop new 
prosthetic devices and change our understanding of what constitutes human perception. 
But in any given historical period, the natural sciences concern themselves with activity 
that is at a non-human scale, and thus they develop the practice of using sampling and 
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case studies and the practice of inductively generalizing to the whole population. This 
practice treats the generalized law or model as the governing structure that stands outside 
of the particulars.  
Although such methods are adequately suited to the physical sciences, they are not 
suitable to the social sciences, where we are able to follow the complex relational 
ontology of particulars without positing an overarching structure. Latour will take up 
Tarde’s point and argue that contemporary social scientists who ape after the natural 
sciences, in putting such structure to work, fail to grasp the virtue of their privileged 
access to that which they study. The individual-structure distinction breaks down in the 
social sciences, because the social sciences involve humans who study human society 
(rather than the society of bees or swamps).1 For Latour the implications of this are 
monumental, as it offers a “completely different way of calibrating what should be 
expected from any science of any society.” (Latour, 2010, p. 149).  
According to Latour, a new quantitative method, based on Tarde’s insights and 
developments in new media, will resist the tendency to construct laws and models that 
transcend the multiplicity under study. Such methods will not, according to Latour, 
inductively generate models that transcend the particular or the components of the 
network. In these digital times, argues Latour, we do not have to abstract from the 
particulars to the structural law. If in the past, ethnography was said to attend to the 
particulars of situated individuals through thick description, allowing for an intimacy and 
proximity that defined qualitative methods, the digital saturation of most lives and 
contexts brings the quantitative into that proximate fold. If in the past, the quantitative 
                                                        
1 Presumably this privilege also applies to bees who study bee society. 
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was that model or code that failed to capture the kind of data collected when up close and 
intimate with a participant, the internet has completely altered the nature of proximity and 
intimacy. According to Latour, Tarde anticipates this digital turn, arguing that the 
quantitative operates at the most minute and proximal scales:  
 
the more we get into the intimacy of the individual, the more discrete quantities 
we’ll find; and if we move away from the individual towards the aggregate we 
might begin to lose quantities, more and more, along the way because we lack 
the instruments to collect enough of their quantitative evaluations. (Latour, 
2010, p. 149).  
 
In other words, the individual is always already the quantitative in that the ‘one’ is never 
given. This qual-quant collective character of our individuality is based on the 
monadological fractal fold discussed in the previous section. The challenge is then to 
follow all these dividuals for how they are aggregated, and to resist moving to a static 
image of society; we must study the way that dividuals come together to form 
assemblages without producing a rigid structure.  Rather than deploy the quantitative as 
that which produces rigid structure, we need to reclaim the dynamic and unfinished 
nature of number (and structure), to consider quantity as itself infinitely elastic. When we 
make the leap to rigid overarching structures, we operate only according to a discrete 
image of quantity, and an impoverished understanding of multiplicity. Monadology is 
precisely what helps us imagine a different mingling of the discrete and the continuous, 
collapsing them ontologically. The vast amounts of quantitative ‘evaluations” that are 
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generated every milli-second produce data waves that are human society. A quantum 
flow cannot be attributed to an individual, because by definition it breaks with the 
conventions of location or attribution. Such flows circulate stochastically across an 
assemblage, making them quantifiable through probabilistic measures. A flow partakes of 
an abstract quanta or “degree of deterritorialization” in the line of flight. Flows are 
always detached desires or beliefs, imitative and varying as they circulate. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) will argue that a statistics of these flows is essential, “providing it 
concerns itself with the cutting edges and not only with the “stationary” zone of 
representations.” (p. 219). Indeed Deleuze (1988a) will argue for a “qualitative 
probabilism” (p.30).  
 
Even at our most personal moments, when we feel most authentic, there are minute 
calculations occurring at all scales. One can see in Tarde’s monadology an attempt to 
think bio-power long before the term was used, to recognize the way that the body and 
the neuron and various other traits and tensors join the material flow of capital, indeed 
they comprise the flow of capital as much as any abstract currency. For Tarde, economy 
and ecology are entwined. It is not that one is a superstructure and the other a material 
base. There are no principles guiding economics (no invisible hands or ossified social 
norms), except for those passionate attachments that happen in the proximal moment of 
encounter. These moments entail calculations of ‘value’, micro-evaluations of more or 
less, relational adjustments of assemblages, whereby two adjacent molecules adjust to the 
milieu of their encounter. Calculations are thus never cut-off from the social world, 
performed in some cold objective way upon the material base, because the material is 
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always already social. This is not the usual socio-cultural approach, not the “cultural 
capital” approach of Bourdieu, because Tarde draws principally from a philosophy of 
immanence. He doesn’t interpret or code culture in terms of capitalism, but rather sees 
capitalism as part of the monadology. For Tarde, the capitalist hydra is just one example 
or one facet of the pulsing monadology – there is no phase of capitalism out of which we 
emerge. Capital is part of an ontological process of intensification, by which the 
monadology folds and creases, interlacing what was previously distant, contaminating 
what was once unified or isolated, through imitation and invention.  
 
As social science researchers begin to study millions of participants who share their 
“natural data” on twitter, instagram and other social networks, we begin to glimpse the 
undulations and involutions of this quantum flow. The calculations spread across a 
network of relations through “imitative rays” or what Latour and Lépinay (2009) will call 
“contaminations” (p.9). Desire and belief are contagious, leaping from adjacent cell to 
adjacent cell, but never through a context or structure, or any ‘norm’ that seems to sit 
outside of the immediacy and immanence of the encounter. There is no plan guiding 
contagion, no structural schemas that determine its progress, and so all we can do as 
social scientists is study its flow. Everything is potentially a number for Tarde, but it is 
not that we are simply more able to measure what was previously innumerable. Tarde 
offers a new concept of number – a new way of thinking about the material nature of 
quantity: “For him, there already exists in the batter, dare we say, a particular type of 
quantum that has only an indirect link to what economists call the quantifiable” (Latour 
and Lépinay, 2009, p. 17). It is not that the social scientists are doomed because of their 
 21 
mania for calculating, but that they haven’t pursued the proliferation of “tensors” that 
carry “a vast reserve of quantification” (Latour and Lépinay, 2009, p. 17). Only after 
multiplying the types of quantum does the quantitative fabric of life come alive. The 
calculating universe is simply operating at scales that most often escape us, while we 
wander around within this “swarming of assessments” (Latour and Lépinay, 2009, p. 30).  
 
It is because of this background of “calculable forces” that the addition of 
calculative devices, of metrological chains, can have such a performative, 
explicatory capacity, that they can even become forces of production. It is because 
the monads calculate at all times and in all possible manners that the addition of 
calculative devices, which are miniscule prostheses, brings about such a prodigious 
amplification of evaluations. (Latour and Lépinay, 2009, p. 40) 
 
In the next section I look more carefully at how this prodigious amplification of 
evaluation shapes the fractal monadology of today.   
 
5. Big data and dividuation 
 
Latour (2010, 2012) claims that current techniques for digital navigation through 
social data may provide us with the kind of methods we need to pursue Tarde’s vision of 
social science. Rather than work with a two-tiered model, between the individual and the 
aggregate, Latour suggests that digital navigation, large data mining methods, and new 
visualization software may reflect the principles of Tarde’s proposal for a different kind 
 22 
of sociology.  Rather than relying on small samples from populations, and creating a 
model that is meant to stand outside the data and represent the data, one can study the 
long lasting features of social order from within the large data set. Latour describes how 
the internet search itself operates as a network of continuous feed-back associations. The 
search entity is defined by a network of other entries, and although these form the 
attributes of the entity, they are also changed through the very act of searching. When I 
search for “monadology” I generate a list of entries that form the attributes of the name 
“monadology”, but since my search intervenes in the network, through ranking 
algorithms and IP address tagging, the relationship between entity and attribute is 
continuously reconfigured. In other words, the name “monadology” is folded into the 
mesh of its own associations.  
 
‘Specific’ and ‘general’, ‘individual’ and ‘collective’, ‘actor’ and ‘system’ are 
not essential realities but provisional terms that depend rather on the ease with 
which it is possible to navigate through profiles and to envelope them inside 
their names. (Latour, 2012, p. 4) 
 
The more cumbersome the navigation, suggests Latour, the more likely we are to 
introduce an external model for representing the complexity. However, introducing 
external models to describe multiplicities is what we need to resist doing, according to 
Latour. Similarly, the concept of structure (as something qualitatively different from the 
particulars) is also to be avoided in the study of collective behaviour in digital networks, 
whether it is a structure assumed to be a priori or emergent.  
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The experience of navigating through profiles available on digital platforms is 
such that when you move from one entity – the substance – to its network – the 
attributes – you don’t go from the particular to the general, but from particular to 
more particulars. (Latour, 2012, p. 8).  
 
If there are long lasting or enduring entities (be they identities, institutions, affects, etc.) 
within this network, it is not because they are qualitatively different from the particulars – 
they don’t stand outside as structural models representing the network. An enduring 
entity like an institution or gender identity – and thus an aspect of social order – endures 
because it is repeated with variation (like Tarde’s imitation and invention), enough times 
to be counted as the same, but with enough variation and modulation to be ‘alive’. In the 
case of the internet search, an agent or entity is never part of a whole, since there is no 
whole that isn’t always made bigger by a network association. In other words, the 
proliferating associations that are generated through the search also add more – increase 
in number – the items in the list. The ‘whole’ expands in time as we navigate through the 
dataset. Profiles are expanding exponentially when searched.  
 
In this new empiricism, there are no norms that transcend the particulars, just meshworks 
assembling in a new kind of quantitative relationship. This quantitative assembling is no 
longer based on deterministic parametric models that force the quantitative data to 
conform to pre-given distributions. One might consider this new approach as a kind of 
grounded theory for quantitative methods, where the stochastic and probabilistic 
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mutations remain operative at the level of the particular. We can see in this approach an 
attempt to reclaim quantitative methods as part of a philosophy of immanence, and 
indeed an opening onto the unscripted future of the qual-quant concept. And this is why 
Latour so appreciates Tarde – not only does the monadology support Latour’s image of 
interaction as an undulating generative network, but also because Tarde shows how 
“science is in and of the world it studies. It does not hang over the world from the 
outside.” (Latour, 2010, p. 158).  
 
A research method that tracks the huge quantities of traces of internet activity, following 
the dynamic aggregate as it grows, will produce a map of convolutions and folds. Latour 
will suggest we follow the “trajectory of individual innovations” as best we can, or in 
Deleuze’s terms, the dividuals that break off and spread through the network. Imitation 
and innovation are tracked across the mesh of associations, so that an “entity” comes to 
be known “by adding more and more items to its profile.” (Latour, 2012, p. 7). Latour 
suggests that this proliferation might be an appropriate way to interpret Tarde’s concept 
of “imitative rays” as the mechanisms by which swarms and networks reproduce and 
repeat (with difference) that which holds them together (p. 15). Thus the particular 
algorithms that we use are hugely significant in determining how we engage with digital 
data sets. It’s important to keep in mind that the searches we perform are “a consequence 
of the type of technology used for navigating inside datasets”(Latour, 2012, p. 4). Recent 
studies of emotion using twitter data offer an interesting and problematic example, as 
they tap large data sets regarding a topic that was typically studied in the past using 
interviews and surveys, two qualitative methods that were unlikely to supply insights into 
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the spontaneous and public nature of emotion (Golder & Macy, 2011). Using three 
hundred million tweets, and software for analyzing text for lexical bundles, researchers 
are creating cartograms or maps in which the original map of a region is distorted and 
stretched in accordance with the emotional nature of the tweets (Mislove et al, 2010). 
Although the software is designed to maintain the original borders of states, the area 
within borders is scaled in proportion to the number of tweets (coded for emotion) that 
originate there (see figure #1). The researchers track the contagion of emotion across the 
region during a 12 hour period, using color codes to show how emotions change over 




Of course, there are limitations to such data in terms of what they are able to say about 
emotion. These same limitations, however, are precisely what make these methods 
suitable to the fractal monadology of Deleuze and Latour. Such an approach studies 
emotions impersonally, as something that circulates across populations. The software 
limitations direct attention to the transmission rather than the content (the lines rather 
than the nodes). Human bodies become the medium of emotional expression, and are 
perhaps no more than contractions of this flowing affect across the network. This focus 
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can be seen as part of the turn away from the phenomenological body of lived experience, 
towards a rhizomatic network of contaminations (Colebrook, 2014). But this focus can 
also be seen as part of the cybernetic fantasy of perfect transmission, an example of “the 
small cybernetic honeybee engaged in thoughtless, but communicative, actions.” 
(Halpern, 2014, p. 75). In the cybernetic fantasy, affect becomes information. These early 
approaches to digital computation were intent on displacing materiality with information 
(Hayles, 1999). They claimed that computational sciences would no longer have to 
contend with the question of indexicality - cybernetics was the science of form, leaving 
materialism behind. Indeed, the cartogram above, “pulse of a nation”, seems to achieve 
this translation.  
 
But it is precisely this approach to the digital and the quantitative that is being contested 
in this paper, as I attempt to reclaim computation as immanent to matter. My aim is to 
seek out a counter-history of calculation and computation (in this case, that found through 
Leibniz-Tarde-Deleuze-Latour) that mutates this cybernetic fantasy. As Halpern (2014) 
suggests, Deleuze “is involved in an ethical act of excavating this possibility and 
repeating this cybernetic displacement” but in the interest of producing new opportunities 
for thought rather than for control (p. 58). For Norbert Weiner and Warren McCullough 
and other early champions of cybernetics, an obsession with “purpose” and prediction 
fueled the displacement of matter with information(Rosenblueth et al, 1943). Deleuze and 
Latour critique this communication model of interaction, exemplified in cybernetics but 
found in many language-focused theories of communication, because such models 
always pay tribute to a logic of exchange, translation, and teleological purpose (de 
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Freitas, 2013). The mistake of cybernetics was to treat communication and computation 
as equivalent to the act of choosing between discrete units. Although this approach 
influenced the development of systems theory and various related attempts to think about 
human society as ecology, the cybernetic objective was premised on an ideal of 
instantaneous and unadulterated transmission of information.2 Instead, Deleuze will 
reclaim Bergson from Weiner, and show how “the material universe … is the machine 
assemblage” but without the ideal of communication and its prescriptive futures. Indeed, 
Deleuze will propose a calculating matter that doesn’t pay tribute to the cybernetic image 
of communication as a set of choices between two discrete immaterial units. Following 
Bergson and Whitehead and other process philosophers, Deleuze will collapse perception 
and matter, but not as a way of anticipating future signals and predicting future acts of 
communication.3  
 
In the case of the twitter data, it’s worth noting that the moving image of the undulating 
cartogram (available on the website) incorporates a continuous visualization of an event 
using miniscule repetitive discrete acts. Cybernetics would see a teleological purpose in 
this unfolding event, amplified from act to act. They used the term “purpose” to 
emphasize the goal or target or aim of transmission in any act of communication. When 
                                                        
2 It’s important to note that computer science research continues to look at biological 
systems for how they solve distributed processing and communication problems, with a 
view to designing human computational networks according to these models. For instance, 
Navlakha and Bar-Joseph (2014), compare different biological systems for speed of 
communication and the relative robustness of the network, suggesting that distributed 
algorithms mimic these structures.    
3 In an ironic fold, Wiener (1954) referenced the process philosophy of Henri Bergson to 
advocate for the collapse of matter and perception. Cybernetic theorists will tap the same 
process philosophers as Deleuze will – Bergson, Whitehead, James. In this we see how 
historical excavations of the kind achieved by Deleuze are crucial for opening up to different 
futures.   
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feed-back loops from these goals are incorporated into the event (as described above 
regarding the internet search), they described this as teleological purpose (Rosenblueth et 
al, 1943). It seems crucial to me that we problematize this notion of purpose as we 
explore alternative imaginaries of computation that refuse to pay lip service to a 
cybernetic fantasy of control.4 Another crucial factor in rethinking computation is the 
issue of unit. If we treat the word “miniscule” as a term that refers to an objective and 
stable unit, we adopt the cybernetic tenet that all behavior is commensurable. If instead of 
the unit we adopt the fold, as discussed in previous sections of this paper, calculation 
becomes a plastic topological relation between the folds of the monadology. In other 
words, the folds of the monadology possess different geometries that are potentially 
incommensurable – there is no unit that can be used to measure each. The curvature of 
the fold is precisely what allows for different kinds of geometries, where basic notions 
such as “straight” and basic spatial relationships abide by different axiomatic constraints. 
Thus a fractal monadology possesses heterogeneous measures across its surface, and 
there is no constant of proportionality that can be used to measure one by the other. As 
we look to the future of computational methods in the social sciences, it seems essential 
that we study this radical incommensurability between measures. I follow Halpern (2014) 
who suggests we must excavate alternative genealogies in the history of ideas and “reveal 
these absurd, conflicting, and nondeterministic options for envisioning the future of how 
we sense and live in data-filled environments” (p.35). 
 
6. Concluding comments  
                                                        
4 See Jackson (2013) for an alternative approach to purpose.  
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The current flourishing of computational distributed networks that link the somatic with 
the political demand new ways of thinking about how the digital is incorporated into life. 
Drawing on the sociologist Gabriele Tarde, we find that both Deleuze and Latour 
advocate for a new kind of monadology that incorporates the digital. I have characterized 
this monadology as fractal, because the folds are creased by an iterative imitation or an 
algorithmic repetition of miniscule quantitative evaluations. If socio-cultural research 
methods tended to produce reflections of that which they studied, this new empiricism 
will study the diffraction of knowledge and affect as it flows across the folds. The 
monadology offers an impersonal and anonymous matter, in which ‘each’ monad 
“reflects nothing, but absorbs all” (Galloway, 2014, p. 141). Monadology is thus a 
relational ontology without exchange, since there are no individuals that might 
communicate or transfer knowledge. Thus Tarde’s focus on ‘to have’ is not about a trait 
belonging to an individual, but is meant to direct our attention to the flow of traits across 
the monadology. The monadology is both the one and the many – a way of rethinking 
multiplicity and advocating for an “inclusive materialism” (de Freitas & Sinclair, 2014).  
 
Just to clarify, this paper is not arguing that matter is ultimately digital or binary. This 
paper turns to monadology as a way of rethinking the infinite variability of the 
quantitative. The concept of “the smallest interval” or infinitesimal plays a crucial role in 
this argument. Monads are ultimately composed of “infinitely small differences”, rather 
than being “the sum of definite and discrete differences.” (Tarde, 1895/2012, p.9). The 
infinitely small difference or infinitesimal does not differ from the finite only by degree – 
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one cannot arrive at the infinitesimal after some countably infinite set of cuts. This makes 
the infinitesimal “qualitatively different” from the finite (Tarde, 1895/2012, p. 11). One 
might think of the infinitesimal as force, mobility, duration, or potential energy. In the 
terminology of Deleuze, we can say that the infinitesimal is the virtual dimension of the 
finite. This virtual dimension is that which animates matter – “these tiny beings which we 
call infinitesimal will be the real agents, and these tiny variations which we call 
infinitesimal will be the real actions.” (Tarde, 1895/2012, p. 11). As Tarde points out, 
mathematicians developed the theory of the infinitesimal in order to understand quantity 
and yet they proposed “elements which are not at all quantitative” (Tarde, 1895/2012, p. 
11).  
 
I want to close with a few more comments about the ethical issues associated with this 
new empiricism. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak to these ethical issues when they 
claim that “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics” (italics 
in original, p. 213). They direct our attention to how the political spreads across all 
bodies, at diverse scales, tracking traits and tensors across a field of intensity, a non-
human field that trembles and quakes with multiplicity. The individuated body – the 
organic image of the body as organism – is disassembled through Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of becoming imperceptible. I believe their notion of micro-politics and becoming 
imperceptible are crucial as we engage with a fractal monadology in these digital times. 
Indeed, Tarde will describe the infinitely small infinitesimal as “the imperceptible”. 
(Tarde, 1895/2012, p.9). 
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This molecularization of politics has the potential to radically open up our research to 
new ways of attending to the biopolitics of life: “It’s too easy to be antifascist on the 
molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and 
nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 215). The links between macro human politics and the biopolitics of flow and 
fold are yet to be adequately studied. Deleuze and Guattari will argue that forces traverse 
these various scales, and that macro-politics are plugged-into micro-politics, through a 
molecularization of agency: 
 
Politics on the grand scale can never administer its molar segments without also 
dealing with the micro injections or infiltrations that work in its favor or present 
an obstacle to it; indeed, the larger the molar aggregates, the greater the 
molecularization of the agencies they put into play. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
204).  
 
These micro injections and infiltrations (dividuals) are exactly what Tarde was focusing 
on, in his proposal for a new kind of quantitative social science. My attempt in this paper 
has been to locate current trends in social science research as part of this philosophical 
tradition of monadology. My hope is that this tradition also furnishes us with reasons for 
studying the proliferation of previously indiscernible miniscule acts, operating according 
to micro calibrations and quanta that would never before have been considered relevant. 
And yet, as the history of cybernetics makes clear, attention to the computational 
dimension of human culture can lead to reductive behaviorism and essentialism. 
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Moreover, there are serious ethical issues evident in internet swarm behavior; we can 
well imagine how this data is evidence of a panic, as dividuals spread contagiously across 
various digital networks such as twitter and facebook through re-tweets and broadcasting, 
resulting in swarm behavior that is often disturbingly destructive. Latour doesn’t deny 
this fact, but nor does he offer counsel for how to proceed. The job of designing ethical 
algorithms and checks on the proliferation of destructive digital memes is left to us. If 
software design is where ethical filtrations might occur, researchers must learn how to 
critique the particular software practices adopted in the field, while also becoming more 
inventive in altering this software to suit unscripted futures. 
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